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Community as a Redistricting Principle:
Consulting Media Markets in Drawing District Lines
JASON C. MILLER*
Very soon, legislators, commissioners, and judges will begin battling over how
to draw the lines for the next decade’s legislative districts. In trying to meet the
federal legal requirements, line drawers will look at federal requirements like
population equality1 and race;2 state requirements like protecting county and
municipal lines,3 compactness,4 and contiguity;5 and practical political
requirements like protecting incumbents6 and gerrymandering for partisan
advantage.7 But hopefully, somewhere in the mix, there is room for common-sense
goals like increasing voter participation and drawing districts that fit public
expectations. To achieve these goals, legislative districts, both for Congress and the
state house, should be drawn to reflect the actual communities that exist in that
state. A city and its suburbs or nearby neighboring cities share an identity, culture,
and economy that simply ought to be linked in the same district to the extent
possible. Perhaps most importantly, communities often share the same media

* Associate at Sherman & Howard L.L.C. in Denver, Colorado. University of
Michigan J.D. 2009. The author would like to thank Ellen Katz, Laura Davis, and Nicole
Traxler-Wright for their feedback on this Article. The views expressed in this Article are the
author’s alone.
1. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732 (1983) (requiring “absolute equality” of
population in congressional districts).
2. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1238 (2009) (deciding whether
Voting Rights Act requires a district be drawn to help racial minority elect preferred
candidate) (plurality opinion); see also Ellen D. Katz, From Laredo to Fort Worth: Race,
Politics, and the Texas Redistricting Case, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 38, 39
(2006) (“[J]urisdictions must respect at least some existing racially-defined communities . . .
.”).
3. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 3.63(c) (2004) (requiring that the redistricting plan break
as few county, city, and township boundaries as reasonably possible); IOWA CODE § 42.4(2)
(2009) (“[D]istrict boundaries shall coincide with the boundaries of political subdivisions of
the state.”); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 298 (2004) (discussing protection of
political subdivision lines).
4. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. 5, § 14; IOWA CODE § 42.4(4) (2009); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 3.63(c) (2004).
5. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. 5, § 14; IOWA CODE § 42.4(3) (2009); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 3.63(c) (2004).
6. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 300 (mentioning “the time-honored criterion of incumbent
protection”).
7. Bonnie Erbe, Democrats Must Keep Politics in 2010 Census; Gerrymander—and
(Mar.
3,
2009),
Gender-mander—Away!,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
http://www.usnews.com/blogs/erbe/2009/03/03/democrats-must-keep-politics-in-2010census-gerrymander--and-gender-mander--away.html (describing partisan gerrymandering
as a uniquely American tradition, like Thanksgiving).
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market. Two current congressional districts offer examples of lines that ignore
these common-sense boundaries and unnecessarily split communities.8
Michigan’s Seventh Congressional District grabs the suburbs of Lansing, where
Michigan State University’s green and white colors dominate, and links them with
Ann Arbor, home of its arch-rival University of Michigan.9 The district splits the
Ann Arbor area in half, with lines drawn for partisan advantage rather than to
reflect any common-sense approach. The rest of the district includes rural areas of
southern Michigan. The distinctive communities in this district have nothing in
common and the obvious community lines, apparent on any map or to anyone who
lives in this district, are ignored. Furthermore, the district crosses four media
markets—Detroit, Lansing, Toledo, and Grand Rapids/Kalamazoo/Battle Creek.10
The major newspapers in the district must cover multiple members of Congress in
any story about federal legislation; opponents wishing to criticize the incumbent on
broadcast television or radio would spend inefficiently, as much of their advertising
dollars would reach voters outside of the district.11 The reality of the district’s
shape almost certainly influences campaign strategy, whether or not it ultimately
drives up the cost.12 The lines respect city and most county borders, but do so by
linking an odd series of counties and subdivisions at the expense of actual
communities.

8. This problem, of course, is not limited to my two examples. “These gerrymandered
districts often cover wide areas of territory, generally encompassing numerous communities
and many different media markets.” Jeffrey G. Hamilton, Comment, Deeper into the
Political Thicket: Racial and Political Gerrymandering and the Supreme Court, 43 EMORY
L.J. 1519, 1557 (1994).
9. CENTER FOR GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION, DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY, MICHIGAN’S 15 CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS: 2001 APPORTIONMENT PLAN
(2002), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/Congress01-state-E_43697_7.pdf.
10. Fitzy, 7th District Media Markets – Part II, WALBERG WATCH (July 8, 2008, 6:02
PM), http://walbergwatch.blogspot.com/2008_07_01_archive.html.
11. As one court explained in a slightly different context, “the lack of congruence
between media markets and district boundaries render [television] advertising an inefficient
and ineffective way to communicate with voters.” Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 130 (2d
Cir. 2004). Campaigns in such areas might turn to cable advertising as an alternative to
broadcasting into other districts or states.
12. See Shanto Iyengar, Daniel H. Lowenstein & Seth Masket, The Stealth Campaign:
Experimental Studies of Slate Mail in California, 17 J.L. & POL. 295, 300 (2001) (“[F]or
candidates running in districts much smaller than the media markets in which they are
located, mail generally is the only economically feasible medium.”); see also Seth
Grossman, Creating Competitive and Informative Campaigns: A Comprehensive Approach
to “Free Air Time” for Political Candidates, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 351, 383 (2004)
(“Cable, on the other hand, enables candidates to more precisely channel their messages to
individuals within their voting districts—to be more ‘geoefficient,’ in the jargon of cabletelevision sales representatives. This quality of cable television is . . . important to . . .
candidates who represent[] a district that is within a large media market or covers multiple
media markets . . . .”).
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Some districts do not even have the decency to respect city lines. Ohio’s
Thirteenth Congressional District cuts a jagged, diagonal line from Lake Erie
across the Cleveland suburbs and down into Akron. Summit County, with Akron as
its county seat, is carved into three jagged districts that divide individual
neighborhoods. Akron’s eastern suburbs are in a district dominated by Youngstown
to the east. Of course, drawing districts with equal population requires some
bending of community and local government lines to even out the population, but
the greater Akron area is large enough to fill its own congressional district.13 There
are numerous advantages to putting a community like Akron into a single
congressional district.
When a congressional district covers a single media market, or at least does not
snake across several, it makes it easier for the media to track and report on the
representative and his or her actions. This in turn makes it easier for the public to
identify their elected official and that official’s actions. And a single media market
also makes it easier to publicly oppose or challenge a representative’s policies
through letters to the editor, paid media, or “earned media” generated through
demonstrations.14 This might help to explain the link between media markets and
voter turnout, as the evidence indicates that people who live in districts drawn
around media market lines—and not necessarily political subdivision lines—are
more likely to vote.15 This is likely the result of voters being more informed about
the candidates.16 The data shows that “[t]he more a district conforms to its media
environment, the more likely it is that citizens are able to recall the names of
candidates running for office in that district.”17 The increased information costs and
difficulty in learning about candidates when districts do not conform to media
markets stifle participation.18 Furthermore, disrupting media markets might
particularly burden minority voter turnout.19

13. In 2000 the average size of a congressional district was 646,952. Congressional
Apportionment, NATIONALATLAS.GOV, http://www.nationalatlas.gov/articles/boundaries/a_
conApport.html#two. The Akron metro area had a population of 694,960 in 2000. Akron,
OH MSA Population and Components of Change, REAL ESTATE CTR.,
http://recenter.tamu.edu/data/popm/pm0080.htm.
14. “Earned media” is a common political phrase for free media, as contrasted with
paid media such as advertisements. Examples include op-eds and news coverage. See use of
the phrase in Manu Raju, Jonathan Martin & John Bresnahan, Finger-Pointing Begins for
Dems, POLITICO (Jan. 19, 2010, 12:29 AM), http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=44
530A92-18FE-70B2-A84AAC11926FC1EE.
15. Richard N. Engstrom, District Geography and Voters, in REDISTRICTING IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM 65, 77 (Peter F. Galderisi ed., 2005) (“[P]eople who live in districts with
greater levels of conformity to media markets are more likely to turn out to vote than those
in districts with lower levels of conformity to media-market boundaries.”).
16. Id. at 78.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 77–78.
19. Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Joel Waldfogel, Strength in Numbers: Group Size and
Political Mobilization, 48 J.L. & ECON. 73, 74 (2005).
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More name identification, an easier time identifying the official’s votes on key
issues, and higher voter turnout create the possibility for greater accountability. It is
harder to get voters involved and active in the political process if they cannot figure
out who their representative is—people often have trouble understanding that they
can live in the same town and have different representatives, or why the U.S. House
website requires them to use their ZIP+4 to email their member of Congress. Many
grassroots political organizations are created based on the community, not the
artificial district lines.20 Anti-war groups organize in Ann Arbor, but find their
community split in two. Pro-life groups in the greater Akron area have to help their
members identify their member of Congress before encouraging them to express
their opinion.21 As Judge Jones explained:
Traditional, objective districting criteria are a concomitant part of truly
“representative” single member districting plans. Organized political
activity takes place most effectively within neighborhoods and
communities; on a larger scale, these organizing units may evolve into
media markets and geographic regions. When natural geographic and
political boundaries are arbitrarily cut, the influence of local
organizations is seriously diminished. After the civic and veterans
groups, labor unions, chambers of commerce, religious congregations,
and school boards are subdivided among districts, they can no longer
importune their Congressman and expect to wield the same degree of
influence that they would if all their members were voters in his
district. Similarly, local groups are disadvantaged from effectively
organizing in an election campaign because their numbers, money, and
neighborhoods are split. Another casualty of abandoning traditional
districting principles is likely to be voter participation in the electoral
process. A citizen will be discouraged from undertaking grass-roots
activity if, for instance, she has attempted to distribute leaflets in her
congressman's district only to find that she could not locate its
boundaries.22

20. That a district’s shape can interfere with normal organizing seems obvious. See
Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 397 n.4 (W.D.N.C. 1992) (“Interference with normal
organizing and campaigning activities could be expected to be particularly acute in this
district, which spans the state’s three largest media markets and stretches over 160 miles.”).
21. See Engstrom, supra note 15, at 67 (“[N]ot knowing where a district takes an
unexpected right turn means not knowing who in the immediate area is, and is not, in the
district. This confusion about district boundaries can lead to confusion about which
legislative race to pay attention to and who among one’s neighbors is also in the relevant
district.”).
22. Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1334 n.43 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (three-judge
panel) (invalidating a redistricting plan) (emphasis in original).
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Sprawling, irregularly shaped districts may have competing interests and lack a
sense of community.23 Districts drawn around publicly understood communities
should be easier to represent. When people live and work in the same district, rather
than crossing a district line in a short commute, their economic interests might be
easier to understand and stand up for. Even political party leaders might find
advantages in having districts drawn up around communities. Party leaders are
often faced with the difficult task of recruiting candidates to run against incumbents
in “safe” districts. These sacrificial lambs may have no chance of winning, but they
offer voters a choice and play a vital, but threatened, role in our democracy.24
When district lines make little sense, instead of simply seeking out willing party
activists or community leaders, party hacks must get out their maps and investigate
which precinct their candidate hopefuls live in. Diagonal districts that do not reflect
community lines and that zigzag through media markets could make it harder and
more costly for a challenger to get her message out,25 adding difficulty to the
candidate recruitment process. And, at the very least, community boundaries are a
much more legitimate basis than the partisanship or incumbent protection that
motivates most redistricting.
The problems with considering community as a redistricting principle are easy
to overcome if the line drawers desire to do so.26 While the equal-population
requirement necessarily forces communities to be broken if they do not fit the exact
number required of equivalent congressional districts, line drawers can make at
least some effort to mitigate this when possible. And when it is possible to draw an
entire district around a single and distinct community—such as the Akron
metropolitan area—they should. Defining communities presents its own difficulty
because “community” is a nebulous and somewhat subjective term. But a little bit
of common sense can go a long way in this regard, as most informed people have
some idea of how the metropolitan areas in their state think of themselves.
Moreover, media markets might be a useful starting tool, as they offer a clear
identification of the boundaries of a community.27 Media markets are important for

23. See DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. 1076, 1086 (N.D. Fla. 1992) (“This long,
irregularly shaped district traverses parts of seventeen counties and involves three major
media markets. The communities linked in this sprawling district are likely to have
competing interests and do not constitute communities of interest.”).
24. For a discussion on the shortage of candidates, see Jason C. Miller, The Unwise and
Unconstitutional Hatch Act: Why State and Local Government Employees Should Be Free to
Run for Public Office, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 313 (2010).
25. See Engstrom, supra note 15, at 82–83 (“Cleaner district-media market
relationships should make it easier for challengers to get their names out to potential voters,
therefore increasing their chances of defeating incumbents.”).
26. See, e.g., Daggett v. Kimmelman, Nos. 82-297, 82-388, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1296, at *9 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 1988) (noting that line drawer had made “reference to media
markets” in fashioning district).
27. Sometimes communities and their media markets straddle state lines, and in such
cases districts will obviously have to split them. See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith & Jason Robert
Owen, Boundary-Based Restrictions in Boundless Broadcast Media Markets: McConnell v.
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two reasons. First, they are important as actual media markets—a concentration of
people consuming the same newspapers and television and radio stations—because
the ease of gathering and disseminating information about candidates increases
voter turnout. Second, media markets are important as indicia of practical
community boundaries, driven in part by market forces and a spontaneous-order
process. Even if the importance of traditional broadcast media outlets is waning,
local-focused new media, such as local and regional political blogs, seem to
continue to fit the old media market lines. Media market boundaries are probably
most important for congressional districts because of their size—many state
legislative districts might naturally conform to media markets—but in all cases
districts should conform to media markets to the extent reasonable under the
circumstances.
The location of actual communities, whether analyzed through defined media
markets or more complex formulations that look at additional boundaries (such as
school districts), should be among the criteria line drawers consider during
redistricting. Community boundaries as defined by media markets should not be the
only criteria for courts to base a decision on, but should be included among the
many factors examined when forced to decide among competing plans.28 More
scholarship is needed to examine the significance of media markets to
redistricting,29 but there are good reasons to include common sense community
considerations in any push for redistricting reform or discussion of the optimal way
to create districts.

FEC’s Underinclusive Overbreadth Analysis, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 240, 253 (2007)
(“The Cincinnati media market covers southwestern Ohio and parts of Indiana and northern
Kentucky.”). But in most circumstances, media markets will offer a helpful starting point for
identifying community lines.
28. A few courts have already looked at media markets in deciding redistricting cases.
See, e.g., Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 502 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (discussing media
markets); Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1365 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (noting that one of the
reasons the state rejected a proposed districting plan was that “a candidate to be successful
will have to run in four major media markets in Georgia”); Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408,
472 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (noting that both parties submitted evidence of media markets in a
redistricting case); Arizonans for Fair Representation v. Symington, 828 F. Supp. 684, 691
(D. Ariz. 1992) (considering media markets in choosing among redistricting plans).
29. See Engstrom, supra note 15, at 82 (noting that media markets are “rarely discussed
in analyses of redistricting questions”).

